|Join Team CCS Support us Site Search|
Science in Public Policy
Facts and scientific evidence apparently play little role in the formulation of our environmental policy, argues Parth J Shah
The question cannot be answered in the abstract; a specific case study is required. Take two recent environmental issues: Supreme Court's order on the use of CNG for public transport in Delhi, and the position of the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) that to save the chiru, the endangered Tibetan antelope, government should remove the ban on shahtoosh trade and allow farming of the chiru. I agree with CSE's chiru policy but disagree with Supreme Court's CNG stand. But my personal stance is not the issue. This is not to criticise the apex court or CSE; I hope both would see the larger purpose of the analysis.
Let's begin with CSE's chiru policy as outlined in "Harvest the wild?" in the May 31 issue of Down to Earth.
Basic facts: Which part of chiru's body gives the wool? At one point, we are told it's the neck hair, but later, "two layers of hair - the guard hair and the undercoat - provide the antelope the armour against the cold. The undercoat, which is sheared or combed for making shahtoosh, is said to be the thickest during winter". Is it the undercoat or neck hair? Do they grow back once sheared? No answer. If they do, there is no need to kill the chiru to collect its wool. The wool can be harvested repeatedly. Why does then harvesting of chiru's neck hair or undercoat turn it into an endangered species? No answer again. The basic facts about the source of the wool and what kills the chiru are missing.
Scientific evidence: They propose that to save the chiru we should be allowed to farm it. But the article provides no evidence that chiru can actually be reared. The sole Indian experiment of captive breeding was aborted due to the "incompetent government". So it's just the issue of Indian government's incompetence or unwillingness to invest in such experiments. China's success in captive breeding of musk deer, we are told, required "a lot of investment and complex technology". Towards the end of the article, however, we hear from William Bleisch, a researcher in Hong Kong, "several attempts have been made to raise the chiru in captivity outside India, but most have failed. The problem is not known. There is great interest in this lucrative possibility." No scientific evidence to support the policy prescription.
Human concerns: A good part of the article is spent on highlighting and personalising the detrimental impact of the shahtoosh ban on the spinners and weavers. Mohidin Rather earned as much as Rs 6,000 a month as a weaver, while his wife made about Rs 40 per day as a spinner. But now they get barely Rs 1,200 to 1,400. The promises of the J&K government for a rehabilitation package are brought to light. All these coalesce into a heart-rending emotional appeal against the ban.
Rhetoric: Emotional appeal joins ad hominem. It turns out that chief minister Farooq Abdullah was strongly against the ban. But the visit of Maneka Gandhi in June 2000, the article claims, suddenly changed his stance.
Now compare this analysis of the chiru policy with Supreme Court's stand on CNG. Scientific evidence of unequivocal superiority of CNG over other fuels is not established. The evidence that we do have about CNG vehicles is from outside India. No experiments have been conducted on the implications of CNG use in Indian conditions, not just the climate, but also the technology, structure, and myriad uses of Indian buses, taxis, and autos. The precautionary principle, waved at issues from global warming to genetically modified food, is set aside.
More astonishingly, no such experiments have even been demanded. What an oversight! CNG pushers did not conduct or contract out such experiments. It's hard to believe that they would have failed in raising the necessary few crores, especially when environmental as well as economic life of millions of Delhiites was at stake. No grant applications to ministries or international agencies could be traced.
The Supreme Court ordered conversion to CNG on July 28, 1998. It set up the Bhure Lal Committee to evaluate "cleanliness" of various fuels on April 27, 2001. It gave four weeks to the committee to collect and assess mountains of literature on pros and cons of various fuels.
The court on March 26, 2001 declared that petrol with one per cent benzene would be considered a clean fuel. The Delhi government then contested that this mitigates the need for complete CNG conversion. The case is still pending. The orders of April 29, 1999 and May 13, 1999 allow registration of diesel taxis if they are Euro II compliant. Should all taxis be then converted to CNG? Does the apex court know what its benches are doing? Despite these confusing signals, the CNG lobby castigated the Delhi government for not taking the July 1998 court order seriously. When a respected research institute challenged the science of CNG choice, the lobby dismissed it as the lackey of petrol and diesel industry. Ad hominem again.
Facts and scientific evidence apparently played little role in the policy on chiru or CNG. Science and human concerns became tools of rationalisation. In case of chiru, human angle got highlighted, but the anguish and harassment of the bus, taxi, and auto drivers found hardly a mention in the publications of CSE. They parodied politicians' concerns for the people and palliated the deafness of the court.
Our environmental policy is shaped by Sowell's vision, and the science and suffering are summoned mainly for rationalisation.
(The author is president, Centre for Civil Society. Useful discussions with Ms H B Soumya, summer intern at CCS, are acknowledged.)